

## **Somalia: Historical Phases of the Islamic Movements**



Abdurahman M. Abdullahi (Baadiyow)

---

### ***Abstract***

*There is very little scholarship on the history of the Islamic movements in Somalia. Available literature mainly addresses Islam from the margins of history through orientalist and secularist discourses, and security perspectives. This paper offers an overview of four phases of the development of the Islamic movements since 1800. The first phase is the Islamic revival (1800-1950) which focuses on the Sufi brotherhoods and their interaction with the colonial powers. The second phase is the rise of the Islamic consciousness (1950-1967) where Islam and nationalism were jointly used as anti-colonial ideology. The third phase is the Islamic awakening (1967-1978) and initiation of the early modern Islamic organizations. The fourth phase is the emergence of organizations of the Islamic movements (1978-..).*

*The narrative of this paper is extracted from the PhD thesis by the author on the Islamic Movement in Somalia. It provides empirically rich narrative of the development of the Islamic movements from insider's perspective.*

**Keywords:** Somalia, Islamic Movements, Somali Modern History, Islamism.

## **Introduction**

The historical evolution of the Islamic movements in Somalia have attracted less academic interest in the research communities and existing modest literature addresses Islam from the margins of history, through orientalist and secularist discourses, and security perspectives. Nonetheless, scholarship on Islam in Somalia has slightly improved since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 and increased role of the Islamic movements afterwards. In particular, in the post-9/11 security studies literature, analysis of the armed Islamic groups have grown; albeit lacks in-depth historical background. This essay offers a general road map of the modern historical developments of Islam within the context of general history of Somalia. It draws on the PhD thesis by the author which provides unique historical analysis of the evolution of the Islamic movements.<sup>1</sup> This paper divides this historical development into four phases: the Islamic revival (1800-1950), the rise of the Islamic consciousness (1950-1967), the beginning of the Islamic awakening (1967-1978), and the emergence of the Islamic movements (1978-..). These historical phases are not mutually exclusive and demonstrate continuity and change. They are dynamic, crosscurrent, and overlap each other. This essay summarizes these four phases and Islamic organizations that played major roles in each historical phase.

## **Literature Review**

New literature on the rising Islamic movements sprang up as part of the security studies that grew exponentially after 9/11, which was an academic campaign to discover what is termed as the threat of “Islamic fundamentalism”.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, Western scholarship on Islamic movement has increased in the two historical periods in which Somalia was engaged in a conflict with Western powers. The first period was the years of Jihad against British colonialism, waged primarily by Sayid Mohamed Abdulle

Hassan in the British protectorate of the northern Somalia (1900-1921). Colonial scholarship showed particular interest in the study of this anti-colonial movement and produced ample literature on this topic. Among these works, two colonial works have particular relevance to the study of this movement: Douglass Jardine's work *The Mad Mullah of Somaliland* and Italian author Francesco Caroselli's book *Ferro e Fuoco in Somalia*.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, nationalist historiography followed suit to immortalize national symbols and offered special attention to the armed resistance against colonialism represented by the Darawish Movement of Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan. In this venue, the works of Said Samatar and Abdi Sheikh-Abdi are paramount.<sup>4</sup> Comparatively, nonviolent Islamic works that majority of the Islamic scholars were engaged received less Western academic interest except few anthropological works.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, there are some historical chapters on individual Sufi scholars produced by B. G. Martin, Said Samatar, and Scott Reese.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, as a general trend and a common denominator among all this scholarship, history of Islam and its role are marginalized, unless recognized as posing a security threat to the Western powers.

Exceptions to the above-stated trend are works in the Arabic language, authored by Islamist scholars. Four works could be placed at the top of these literatures. Two of them were authored by Ali Sheikh Ahmed Abubakar, the third by Ahmed Jumale "Castro", and the fourth by Hassan Makki. Ali Sheikh's first work *Al-Da'wa al-Islamiyah al-Mu'asira fi Al-Qarni al-Ifriqi* is a good introduction to the Islamic call in the Horn of Africa. The work offers historical in-depth and overviews challenges to Islamism that include secularism, illiteracy, tribalism, and policies of the military regime in Somalia. The second book *Al-Somal: Judur al-Ma'asat al-Rahina* seems a complementary to the first book and focuses on the Islamic awakening and its encounter with the military regime. This book is unique in that it provides a detailed description of the execution of

Islamic scholars in 1975 because of the Family Law confrontation between the regime and Islamists. It also provides the reaction of the Muslim world to the execution of the scholars. In addition to that, it offers an Islamist critique of the above-mentioned secular Family Law. Moreover, Ahmed Jumale describes the history and development of Islamic scholars in the Banadir region where Mogadishu is located. His PhD thesis is a useful source on the history of Sufi orders.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, Hassan Makki produced an indispensable work as a PhD thesis “*Al-Siyasat al-Thaqafiya fi al-Somal al-Kabir (1887-1986)*.” This work is a very useful source of the cultural history of Somalia, in particular, it traces cultural competition between Arabic/Islamic and Western education, covering all Somali-inhabited territories of the Horn of Africa.

A similar academic interest with the emergence of Islamic Jihad by Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan in the first quarter of the twentieth century is noted after 9/11 and the declaration of Global War on Terrorism. In this period, many research centers have been producing occasional reports and briefings on Somalia as being a possible haven for terrorists. Somalia also appeared in the headlines of major newspapers, TV networks, radios, and electronic communications. The academic interest experienced an unprecedented growth and numerous papers and articles were published in many languages; of these, four works particularly stand out. These works were authored by an Ethiopian scholar Tadesse Madhene,<sup>8</sup> an Israeli Intelligence officer Shay Shaul,<sup>9</sup> an American scholar Andre le Sage,<sup>10</sup> and Norwegian scholar Stig Hansen.<sup>11</sup> These works are in the field of security studies and counter-terrorism measures and focus on Itihad and Shabab, even though some background studies were made on other organizations.

Shaul Shay’s book *Somalia between Jihad and Restoration* focuses on Somalia as a possible haven for terrorist organizations. The book examines Islamic movements in Somalia with a special focus on Itihad

and its connections with Al-Qaida, Hassan al-Turabi of Sudan Islamic Movement, and Iran during the USA intervention in Somalia in 1992-1995. The last chapters are dedicated to the rise and the fall of the Islamic Courts, the Ethiopian intervention, and its aftermath. This analysis of the challenges of the Islamic Courts and potentiality of Al-Qaida terror in Somalia concludes with remarks on ways to prevent the emergence of a radical Islamic state that harbors terrorism in the Horn of Africa. This work is mainly descriptive and lacks academic depth and analysis.

On the other hand, Tadesse Medhene authored the book of *Al-Itihad: Political Islam and Black Economy in Somalia*, the first comprehensive academic analysis of its kind of this Islamist movement after 9/11. The author provides a brief background of Islamism in Somalia during Siyad Barre rule (1969-1991) and moves on to examine extensively the role of Itihad during the civil war and its interaction with the UN interventions in Somalia. It offers special attention to the issue of the ideological, political, and economic foundation of Itihad that weakened the warlords. The last chapters deal with the Djibouti Peace Process in 2000 and the role of the international and regional actors. The author also offers policy guidelines for future actions to thwart the takeover by Islamists in Somalia. However, the timing of this research, its author, sources, and the main thesis call for suspicion of this study's motives. Tadesse wrote from the Somali opposition's perspective supported by Ethiopia; this opposition conferred in Ethiopia to mobilize their agenda against the Transitional National Government (TNG). The major theme of the book is that Itihad is the umbrella terrorist organization shared by all Islamic organizations and that the TNG was built by Itihad. Therefore, the TNG, as a product of terrorists, should be opposed and replaced by other national institutions with the support of the international community. The recommendations of the author were implemented later in Kenya in 2004 by establishing the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) headed by

the former warlords who befriended Ethiopia. However, the consequence of this policy was disastrous and caused deteriorated security in the Horn of Africa.

Moreover, Andre le Sage's *Somalia and the War on Terrorism* undertook a field research on Islamism and counter-terrorism in Somalia. The author carried out his research in Mogadishu, where he met various local actors such as warlords, Islamic movement leaders, traditional elders, and members of traditional Sufi orders. In particular, he focused on Islah, Itihad, Islamic charities, Hawala-business, and the Islamic Courts. Providing an in-depth analysis of the Islamic movements, he concluded that political Islam is not monolithic, and doctrinal differences and competition exist between the various Islamist movements. Le Sage is credited with predicting the rise of Shabab, a new derivative of Itihad, and warning against it. Considering his dissertation as an initial study and admitting various limitations, he provided a number of recommendations such as continuing research and monitoring, opening dialogue with the moderate Islamists, and addressing social strains that push the population toward extremism. However, this moderate voice did not receive attention during the Bush administration which was entangled with the war on terrorism.

Furthermore, Hansen's work on Al-Shabab is the first comprehensive book on the militant Islamist group. The author examines the development of Al-Shabab chronologically in four stages. The first stage was initial formative period of 2005-06 as part of the Union of the Islamic Courts which had taken control of the capital Mogadishu after defeating the warlords in 2005. The second stage was the period of insurgency against Ethiopian occupation in 2007-2008. The third stage was the period 2009-2010 after the defeat of Somali government supported by Ethiopia and Al-Shabab took control of large territory in the southern Somalia. The fourth stage started in 2010 when Al-

Shabab lost vast territory to the African Union Forces (AMISOM) in collaboration of Somali National Army. This book's in-depth analysis and description of the Al-Shabab is valuable contribution to the subject matter.

There are also many other valuable researches on this topic; for instance, relevant papers include Roland Marshal's study titled "Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War" that outlined the general developments of the ongoing Islamic revival in Somalia.<sup>12</sup> As one of the early studies, the paper carries some errors and misconceptions, which does not belittle its merit and academic value. Also, Adam Hussein's paper "Political Islam in Somali History" offers a brief historical survey of the development of the Islamic movement and the four possible options of its future development. The study recognizes the inevitable role of moderate Islamism and criticizes counter-terrorism policies.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, the International Crisis Group (ICG) produced a unique study of Islamist movements in Somalia, classifying them into three categories: Jihadist Islamism, political Islam, and missionary activism. This report also offered a brief background of the Islamic movements.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, Hansen and Mosley authored a research paper "The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa."<sup>15</sup> The study explored the general question of whether the MB in the region could act as a partner in the quest for development and peace in the Horn of Africa. It includes a historical section on the Islah Movement and its developmental organizations. Finally, the work of Afyare Elmi "Understanding the Conflagration" produces an informative chapter on the role of Islam and Islamic awakening in the peace building in Somalia. Writing from insider's perspective, Elmi concludes with strong statement of inevitability of an Islamist movement's rule in Somalia.<sup>16</sup>

### **Phase One: The Islamic Revival (1800-1950)**

The Islamic revival began in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and dealt with the emergence of the various Sufi brotherhoods. Sufi orders, with their symbolical activities and closeness to people's culture, contributed greatly to the revival of Islam in the masses, using innovative mobilization techniques. The most popular techniques are called Dikri in which religious poems (*Qasaaid*) are composed and chanted in a chorus and in an artistic manner, blessing people, reciting the Qur'an for the sick and diseased, annual remembrance of deceased parents (closer and distant), the commemoration of the birth of the Prophet (*Mawliid*), visiting the blessed sheikh's tombs (*Siyaaro*), etc. These techniques create collectiveness and a sense of belonging and mutual support for the adherents of the Sufi orders. They also create a web of trans-clan networks in society, diluting clan polarization and segmentation.

Although Sufism existed and practiced since early Islamic history, most of the organized brotherhoods emerged in the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries AD. For instance, Qadiriya was founded by Sheikh Abdulqadir al-Jeylani (1077-1166). In Somalia, the advent of Sufism has been recorded since the early fifteen century with the arrival of 44 Islamic scholars under the leadership of Sheikh Ibrahim Abu-Zarbai in 1430. Nevertheless, its renewal and reform as an organized movement was noted from the last quarter of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century. Indeed, Said Samatar wrote, "These years between 1880 and 1920 can be described as the era of the Sheikhs in Somali history."<sup>17</sup> Revival is an important dimension of the historical experience of Muslims; Sufi reformation entailed shifting from individual Islamic activities to institutionalized orders.<sup>18</sup>

Traditional Sufi orders have mainly taken peaceful approaches to socio-religious reform through Islamic propagation and spiritual



revitalization.<sup>19</sup> As such, they dominated religious life, reaching out to populations in the urban and rural areas alike, most of whom had identified with one of the Sufi orders by the nineteenth century. Sufi sheikhs, besides their complementary role in running community affairs, established Islamic commonwealth centers (*Jamaacooyin*) whose dwellers gave their allegiance only to their Sufi masters/sheikhs. Moreover, in contradiction to conventional historiography that considers Sufi orders to be mainly apolitical, many leaders of the Sufi orders and their disciples became the supreme leaders of their communities. In this way, clan allegiances and loyalties were diluted and at times transformed into ideological loyalties. Occasionally, both religious and secular authorities are combined in one leader creating a strong Sufi master or sheikh. Moreover, most of the Islamic education centers were located in settlements on agricultural areas and around water wells, and many of these settlements were later transformed into villages, towns, and cities. In this way, Sufi orders transformed pastoral society to settled communities engaged in agriculture and/or trade.<sup>20</sup>

The two main Sufi orders in Somalia are Qadiriyyah and Ahmadiyah and each of them has its local offshoots.<sup>21</sup> Qadiriyyah was brought to western and northern Somalia in the early sixteenth century by Abubakar b. Abdallah al-Aidarusi (d. 1502) from Hadramout in Yemen and its two branches are Zayli'iyah and Uweysiyyah.<sup>22</sup> Zayli'iyah was founded by Sheikh Abdirahman al-Zayli'i (1815-1882), who was based in Qulunquul near the town of Dhagahbur in the Somali State of Ethiopia. Uweysiyyah was founded by the spiritual master Sheikh Aweys ibn Ahmad al-Barawe (1846-1907). The Ahmadiyah Brotherhood was founded by Ahmad Ibn Idris al-Fasi (1760-1837) and has three offshoots in Somalia: Rahmaniyyah, Salihiyah, and Dandarawiyah. Rahmaniyyah is founded by Sheikh Abdirahman ibn Mohamud (d. 1874) instead of Sheikh Ali Maye Durogba who is mistakenly considered the founder of the Order.

Salihyah has two branches: southern branch introduced by Sheikh Mohamed Guled al-Rashidi (d.1918) and northern branch by Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan (1856-1920). Dandarawiyah was introduced by Sayid Adan Ahmed and has a limited following in northern Somalia.<sup>23</sup>

Scholars of Sufi brotherhood led the initial Somali reaction to the rule of the colonial powers. The historiographical speculation that the Salihyah order was anti-colonial while the Qadiriya order remained acquiescent and even collaborated with the colonizers has no historical basis. The well-known historical fact is that “Sheikh Aweys promoted resistance to the European colonizers in German-occupied Tanganyika and even Uganda and eastern Congo.”<sup>24</sup> Evidences shows that Qadiriya's encounter with colonialism was circumstantial and prudent, and the narrative that focuses on singular approach or prioritizes militancy over peaceful means of struggle is simply myopic. These approaches should be seen as complementing each other, depending on the situations on which available options are evaluated. Movements who encountered colonialism through armed resistance operated in different territories and include both Qadiriya and Ahmadiyah. For instance, Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan who belonged to Salihyah order of Ahmadiyah offshoot led a Darawish Movement for roughly 21 years (1900-1921), against British, Italian, and Ethiopian forces. Moreover, Lafole massacre (1896), where disciples of Sheikh Ahmad Mahdi who belong to the Qadiriya order, were accused for anti-colonial activities and retaliated by the Italians. The Biyamal revolt (1896-1908) led by Macalimiin (Islamic teachers) continued resisting colonization for 12 years and ultimately networked their resistance with the northern one of Darawish Movement, demonstrating the unity of purpose and nationhood. Moreover, revolts led by Sheikh Hassan Barsane (d.1926) and Sheikh Bashir (d.1945) demonstrate their uncompromising attitude towards colonial programs. Unfortunately, most of these movements had been suppressed by 1924,

and their leaders were marginalized, oppressed, eliminated and excluded after the colonial domination of Somalia. On the other hand, Somali Islamic scholars confronted colonialism both armed and non-violent means. Those scholars who opted for violent means have been recorded widely in the Somali history and immortalized, while peaceful and non-violent scholars and activists were neglected and marginalized in the historiography.

With the suppression of the Islamic scholars, new approaches were used to confront colonial influence. It included establishing initially civil society organizations and later political parties. The first civil society organization, the Somali Islamic Association, was founded in Aden in 1925 by the Somali activist Haji Farah Omar.<sup>25</sup> Other organizations that appeared in the Northern Somalia include Khayriyah, the Officials' Union and the Somali Old Boys Association (SOBA). The emergence of the civil society organizations in the Southern Somalia were delayed comparatively with the northern Somalia and appeared to the scene during the Second World War under the rule of the British Military Administration (BMA). Early organizations included *Jamiyat al-Kheyriyah al-Wadaniyah* (Patriotic Beneficiary Union), founded in 1942,<sup>26</sup> the Somali Youth Club (SYC), founded in 1943, and Native Betterment Committee (NBC), founded in 1942.<sup>27</sup> On the other hand, modern political developments of Somalia began in the early years of the Second World War after the 1941 defeat of Italian Fascism in the Horn of Africa and the establishment of the British Military Administration (BMA) in most parts of the Somali territories. The BMA, although completely destroyed existing small economic projects and infrastructures, brought an improved political environment by abolishing the "restrictions of the Italian regime on local political associations and clubs."<sup>28</sup> This new policy encouraged the development of the political consciousness of the Somalis after many of them had participated in the

two wars: the Italian–Ethiopian War of 1935 and the Second World War. As a result, the Somali Youth Club (SYC), a pan-Somali youth organization, was formed on 15 May 1943 in Mogadishu. From its founding members of 13 men, this club grew into political party in 1947 and was renamed as the Somali Youth League (SYL). A comparable rise in the political consciousness appeared in the British Somali Protectorate and similar nationalist party was established in the name of the Somali National League (SNL) in 1951.

### **Phase Two: The Rise of the Islamic Consciousness (1950-1967)**

Islam and Somaliness were harmonious terms used to signify pan-clan and anti-colonial ideologies to resist Christian colonialism and growing westernization. With the total colonial domination by 1930s, Islamic scholars were marginalized from leadership role and the new elites created in the colonial system were steadily taking over national leadership. During this period, Islamic education and understanding of Islam's comprehensive scope was very limited. In particular, consciousness of the political aspect of Islam that aims at creating a state and society based on definitive references to the Islamic principles was not developed yet. The common vision and strategic priority of the Somali people before independence was centered on the liberation of the country from the colonial yoke. Indeed, Islamic consciousness was in high alert because of its role in championing Muslim cause in the Horn of Africa and due to Somalia's geographical location at the Christian-Muslim converging lines. Moreover, as a strategic region connecting the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula with the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean attracting European colonialism and Cold War superpower rivalry, both Islamic and national consciousnesses were continuously provoked.

Thus, both national and Islamic identity and consciousness were intertwined in the historical development of Somalia, offering supra-clan

identity to the traditional society. What these two ideologies have in common is to inculcate people rejection of foreign domination and its uncompromising resistance. Thus, Islamic and nationalistic slogans were used to mobilize the masses for anti-colonial campaigns to liberate the nation. Modern nationalists and Islamic scholars worked collectively and national ideology was compounded from nationalism and Islam. National heroes were acknowledged to be Islamic scholars who national leaders such as Imam Ahmed Gurey, Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, Sheikh Hassan Barsane and Sheikh Bashir.<sup>29</sup> Other factor that prompted the development of the nationalistic and Islamic consciousness was religious antagonism between Somali Muslims and Christian colonizers during the struggle for the independence. Moreover, Christian missionary activities in the Muslim society had provoked resentment in the society. Furthermore, rising Islamic consciousness was specifically linked to the development of modern education in the Arabic language and connections with the Arab/Islamic world. Within local, regional, and international dynamics, Islamic consciousness began to emerge and grow.

The development of the Islamic consciousness should be seen as historical evolution and a range of responses to the challenges from specific tensions. It was concurrent with the growing nationalism in the second half of the twentieth century. They provided a supra-clan identity in a traditional society and shared in being indistinguishable from anti-colonial resistance ideologies. However, with the introduction of a modern education system and competition between Western education in the Italian and English languages and modern education in Arabic in the 1950s, the trends of westernization and Arabism began to emerge. The culture of westernization, carrying with it secularization of the state and society, and Arabism, delivering the Islamic consciousness, nationalism, and anti-colonialism, were fiercely competing with one another. In the

1950s, the Egyptian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood were promoting Arab nationalism and Islamism, respectively. Egyptian cultural influence on Somalia took an added momentum in the 1950s and 1960s within the Cold War politics and mutual strategic cooperation between Somalia and Egypt.

Specifically, two broad sets of factors had contributed to the growth of Islamic consciousness in the 1950s and 1960s. The first set contributed to the increased capacity of the society and its resilience in withstanding the torrent ideas of westernization and western modernization. These factors included the introduction of the Egyptian system of schools, the formation of early Islamic organizations, the provision of scholarships to Somali students in the civil and military higher institutions in Egypt and other Arab countries, and other cultural means. These developments had created a new Arabic-speaking Somali elite, political leaders, and Islamic scholars who were against westernization and secularization and lobbied for Arabism and Islamism. Some of these scholars were influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood ideology and the Salafism of Saudi Arabia and introduced them to Somalia. The second set of factors was involved in provoking the Islamic consciousness. They included the activities of Christian missionaries. The earliest missionaries were French Catholic Mission in British Somaliland (1891-1910), the Roman Catholic Church in Mogadishu (1904-1991) and the Swedish Overseas Lutheran Church in Kismayo (1896-1935). Furthermore, the Mennonite Mission and the Sudan Interior Mission joined the Christian venture in the 1950s, with the return of Italy as the UN trusteeship administrator.

After the independence in 1960, within the local, regional, and global context of the Cold War, regional competition, and transformation of the Somali society, the Islamic consciousness was gradually growing along with the growing westernization of the elites. The manifestations of this growth were the appearance of modern Islamist scholars educated in

Arab universities and marginalized in the job market and the proliferation of Arabic schools, books, newspapers, and libraries. Nevertheless, in the first nine years of the independence, there were no tangible conflicts between Islamic scholars and the new elites, with the priorities of the entire nation seemingly focused on consolidating the independence and pursuing the “Greater Somalia” project. Islamic scholars of these years became the pioneers of a new era of the Islamic awakening, in which Islamic activities took new dimensions.


Finally, the harmonious Somali society, where tradition and modernity coexisted, the state and Islam were not in direct conflict, and tolerance and dialogue were exercised, began to falter. The growth of the Islamist elites and their rejection of marginalization led to increased Islamic activities and eventual establishment of more robust organizations. At the same time, westernization and secularization were also growing. Thus, the gap between the two camps was gradually widening.

### **Phase Three: The Beginning of the Islamic Awakening (1967-1978)**

The awakening of Islam started to take shape after Somalia's independence in 1960 and emerged strongly after 1967. It was as an outcome of the cultural divide promoted by multi-curriculum education programs, in Arabic, Italian, and English, and links with conflicting actors in the Cold War atmosphere. The split of the elites into non-Islamist and Islamist factions slowly began to emerge, challenging social cohesion and the unifying aspects based on race, religion, and national aspiration. The roots of this division can be found in the clash between the nature of the state and nature of the society. The post-colonial nation-state was nationalistic, hierarchical, centralized, and quasi-secular, while the society was clannish, egalitarian, decentralized, and Islamic. In these strained conditions, the society as a whole was torn apart by the elites who gravitated toward competing ideologies such as liberal Western

democracy, Socialism, and Islam. Although they possessed a strong cultural foundation, the weaker and less developed elites during this time were Islamists.

The bifurcation of the elites and their development, as illustrated in the figure (1), demonstrates the four types of elites in Somalia. The traditional elites consist of clan elders and Islamic scholars, who constitute traditional leaders. Modern elites consisting non-Islamist elites and Islamist elites, the two super-structural elites created mainly through modern education.<sup>30</sup> As the diagram indicates the dynamics of Islam (traditional and modern), clan (represented by elders) and the state (represented by secular elites) is the most challenging issue in Somalia.



*Figure 1. The diagram of development of the elites in Somalia*

The relations between the traditional elites are cordial and collaborative in order to maintain community cohesion, however, non-Islamist elites and the Islamist elites are antagonistic because of their different position on the nature of the state. Non-Islamist elites, the inheritors of the post-colonial state, resolutely covet to retain the status-quo of the nature of the state whereas Islamists advocate zealously for its Islamization.<sup>31</sup> The free choice of the citizens through democratic process and peaceful resolution of the elite conflict is blocked by the non-Islamist elites who rely primarily on the support of the western powers. The consequence of this



policy is severe and breeds extremism in the name of Islam and curtails moderate Islamism in general.

Consequently, in 1967, the country was in search of a new ideology, having been embarrassed by malpractices in liberal democracy; thus, socialism and Islamism were luring. Socialism was promoted by the socialist countries, and thousands of the Somali students were offered scholarships and indoctrinated in those countries. These students became later the elites that challenged the workings of liberal democracy. On the other hand, Islamists were not happy with the entire secular tendency of the nation-state and opposed the growing leftist ideology, as well as the liberalist malpractices. They were also dissatisfied with the state policy on Islam that remained very similar to the inherited colonial approach based on the existence of two separate spaces; public and private. Islam which Islamists advocated for as comprehensive and applicable to all aspects of life was relegated to the private realm. They were not satisfied with Islamic window dressing such as establishment of a Ministry of Religious Affairs and occasional gesture of the politicians during Islamic festivities.

In 1967, after the pitiful political and social harvests of the first years of independence, Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was elected President of Somalia, and he appointed Mohamed Ibrahim Igal as the Premier. The new regime adopted two new policies that enhanced the fragmentation and conflict in the Somali society. In the domestic front, the regime planned to curb budding democracy by sowing dictatorship through transforming the ruling SYL party, the only political party in the country. This new trend was supported by Western countries and conservative Arab regimes, in particular Saudi Arabia which offered considerable financial assistance.<sup>32</sup> The goal of this undertaking was to curb the Soviet influence in Somalia and to reverse previous policies geared toward the Eastern blocks initiated by Dr. Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke in 1963.

Therefore, the regime initiated policies intended to encourage the fragmentation of other parties. Consequently, more than 60 clan-based parties competed for 123 seats in the parliament during the 1969 election. As planned by the state, all Members of Parliament from the small, clan-based parties were absorbed within the SYL after the election.<sup>33</sup> In the process, the National Army was implicated in rigging the election to dent its nationalistic image and weaken its credibility. At the same time, the Somali masses became utterly dismayed with the government because of widespread corruption, economic stagnation, rampant unemployment, and clan fighting caused by the rigged election. This state of affairs was characterized by Cabdalla Mansuur as “democracy gone mad.”<sup>34</sup>

The second step taken by the regime aimed at changing national policies on “Greater Somalia” that was the foundation of the Somali foreign policy. Since the independence, Somalia supported Somali liberation movements in the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya, Western Somalia in Ethiopia and French Somaliland (Djibouti) as missing three parts of “Great Somalia”.<sup>35</sup> The new policy was to improve the relations with the Western countries and to curb Soviet influence in Somalia embodied, in their technical support for the Somali army. Prime Minister Igal undertook the soft foreign policy approach of détente which was aimed at alleviating Somalia’s political, military, and economic ailments. He established congenial neighborly relations with Kenya and Ethiopia and restored the severed relationship with Britain in 1962. Somalia broke diplomatic relations with Britain “when the special British NFD Commission determined that, despite the fact that the majority of the Somalis in the region wished to join the Somali Republic, Britain should grant Kenya independence and announced that Kenya will decide on the matter.”<sup>36</sup> The new Somali foreign policy was welcomed by Western powers and Somalia’s neighboring countries but was perceived as a sell-out for the cause of Somali nationalism by domestic political opponents

such as leftists and Islamists.<sup>37</sup> Thus, the two policies of the regime were unpopular, and their ramifications lead to the subsequent political uncertainties. The political gambit that started with the assassination of President Sharmarke on October 15, 1969 and Prime Minister Igal's overt clannish maneuvering in the parliament to elect a new president were the preludes to the military coup on October 21, 1969.

Against this background, the year of 1967 was the culmination of the Arabic cultural influence and the maturation of Islamist elites. In this year, the first organization for Arabic educated elites was established under the name *Munadamat al-Nahdah al-Islāmiyah* "Nahdah" and soon other Islamic organizations followed such as Ahal and Wahdah.<sup>38</sup> The climate was ripe for change, and such organizations were responding to various internal and external tensions. The Somali Islamic awakening was not an isolated phenomenon; it was part of a worldwide Muslim upheaval after the defeat of the Arab forces during the war with Israel in 1967. This defeat set off a wave of soul-searching and the demand for a new ideology to replace the defeated secular Arab nationalism. The answer to the national cataclysm was to seek solace in Islamism, which was until then suppressed by the Arabic nationalist/socialist regimes. Therefore, Islamist movements inspired by Hassan al-Banna, Mawlana al-Maududi, and Sayid Qutub were gaining ground and amassing support. This awakening had been simmering since the suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1954 and the execution of the famous Egyptian Islamic scholar Sayid Qutub along with two other members of the MB in 1966.<sup>39</sup> This event greatly shocked and inspired Muslims all over the world. Many Somali Islamic scholars changed their positive views on the Egyptian regime that they had held because of its earlier provision of educational opportunities for Somalia and its ardent support for the Somali nationalistic cause. As a result of this incident, the MB literature garnered immense interest and attracted huge readership. In particular,

two of Sayid Qutub's works became extremely popular: *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* (Milestones) and *Fi Dīlal al-Qur'an* (In the Shade of the Qur'an), the latter being a 30-volume commentary on the Qur'an with an innovative method of interpretation.

The Islamic awakening in Somalia acquired a new momentum with the military coup in 1969 and the adoption of Socialism as the national ideology. The military regime had adopted modernization policies in line with Socialism which went against the culture of the people and Islamic laws, thereby widening the fissure and ideological polarization in the society. By the end of 1960s, three "Proto-Muslim Brotherhood" organizations were established. These organizations are Nahdah,<sup>40</sup> *Ahl al-Islam* (the People of Islam) "Ahal"<sup>41</sup> and *Wahdat al-Shabab al-Islami* (the Union of Islamic Youth) "Wahdah".<sup>42</sup> Also, Salafia organization *Jamiyat Ihya al-Sunna* (Revivification of the Prophet's Tradition) appeared in the scene.<sup>43</sup> The watershed conflict between the Islamic awakening and the military regime was in the secularization of the Family Law in 1975 and the execution of 10 Islamic scholars and subsequent confrontation between Islamists and the military regime.<sup>44</sup>

Concluding this section, five factors played a pivotal role in strengthening Islamic awakening in Somalia in the 1970s. The first factor is the role of Islamic scholars in spreading modern Islamic-movement concepts and ideas through public education programs and lectures. The second factor is the activities of student organizations of Ahal and Wahdah, especially their enthusiasm and outreach programs. The third factor is the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood literature brought to Somalia by Nahdah. The fourth factor is the encouragement by conservative Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia. The fifth factor is the proclamation of the Socialist ideology and adoption of the secular Family law by the military regime, which ignited enormous Islamic sentiment.

Finally, even though the proto-MB organizations of the Islamic awakening that include Scholar's organization of Nahdah and youth organizations of Ahal and Wahdah were short-lived, their Islamic call and impact were significant and lasting. They played different roles and complemented each other's efforts; for example Ahal and Waxdah focused on recruiting high school and university students in their respective geographical locations, in the southern and northern Somalia. Nahdah assumed the role of providing Islamic education and supplied Islamic literature. Nahdah operated for only three years, although its members remained prominent in the Islamic activism for a long period. Ahal ceased to exist in 1977 after about eight years of active work, and its members were divided into different new Islamic organizations. Wahdah members were divided and some of them joined Itihad in 1983 and others joined Islah in 1999.<sup>45</sup> All three organizations of the Islamic awakening were encountering common challenges of westernization, secularization, and Socialism by employing Islamic activism as their resistance ideology. Moreover, these organizations could be characterized as immature with great emotional attachment to the Islamic teachings and its comprehensive way of life, very low organizational capacity and resources, and idealistic approach to social and political realities in the country. The relationship between these organizations and the military regime gradually developed into an open confrontation which had a lasting impact on the political developments in Somalia.

#### **Phase Four: The Emergence of the Islamic movements (1978-..)**

With the crackdown on Islamists after the Family Law proclamation in 1975, most leading scholars were either imprisoned or fled the country. The Islamic awakening, hitherto united in its ideology and leadership, was fragmented and the ideology of extremism emerged strongly. This was provoked by the harshness of the regime in dealing with Islamic scholars, the encouragement and support by the conservative Arab

regimes of the Islamists, and their contact with the varieties of Islamic ideologies and activism that changed the Islamic landscape in Somalia. In August 1975, seven months after the Family Law fiasco, 60 prominent, high-ranking officers were sacked from their positions. Included in these were the leaders of the Islamic awakening: Sheikh Mohamed Garyare, Sheikh Mohamed Moalim, and Sheikh Abdulqani. Both Sheikh Mohamed Moalim and Sheikh Abdulqani were imprisoned, while Sheikh Mohamed Garyare fled the country. In addition to those imprisoned, some of the activists of the Islamic awakening fled to Saudi Arabia and Sudan, and began to regroup there. It is important to note that the fled of Somali Islamists to Saudi Arabia occurred during a time of booming economies and Islamic revivalism throughout the Arab/Muslim world. This economic well-being and education offered the emerging Islamic movement the impetus to reorganize themselves again. Also, students at Saudi universities who joined the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan and Saudi Arabia were working among Somalis in Saudi Arabia to recruit them into their underground organization (Islah movement). Also, among those who succeeded to flee was the leader of Ahal, Abdulqadir Sheikh Mohamud who regrouped members of Ahal in Saudi Arabia.

As a consequence of the migration of the Islamic activists mainly to Saudi Arabia, three Islamic organizations emerged from the ashes of the Islamic awakening organizations. The first organization that announced itself was the Islah Movement established officially on July 11, 1978. Its establishment was announced after four months of the retreat by the Somali army from the war with Ethiopia.<sup>46</sup> Islah proclaimed representing an ideological continuation of the Nahdah and elected Sheikh Mohamed Garyare as its first leader.<sup>47</sup> The second move towards the Islamist fragmentation was undertaken by Abdulqadir Haji Mohamud, the leader of Ahal who professed Takfir ideology and succeeded to convince prominent leaders of Ahal to adopt ideology of Takfir.<sup>48</sup> Other members

of Ahal who were hesitant to join Islah and the Takfir established a new organization called Jama'a Islamiyah. This organization combined former Ahal members who considered themselves belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood and many graduates from the Saudi universities who claimed adhering to Salafism. Gradually, Salafia tendency gained the upper hand and the organization took on the character of a Salafia movement. This organization evolved in 1983 to Itihad when Wahdah and Jama'a Islamiyah were unified.<sup>49</sup> Therefore, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, five organizations based on three different Islamic persuasions had appeared in Somalia: Muslim Brotherhood persuasion (Islah, Wahdah, Ikhwan "Aala-sheikh"), Salafia (Itihad) and Takfir. Takfir group were not popular and remain small underground organization while other organizations were growing.

By 1990, there were four Islamic organizations: Itihad, Islah, Wahdah and Ikhwan (Aala-sheikh).<sup>50</sup> Indeed, the Islamic awakening and its institutions were inclined to the Muslim Brotherhood methodology though lacked much of the organizational expertise until 1980. However, in the 1980s, Itihad became the strongest Islamic organization in Somalia, and the Salafia ideology took prominence;<sup>51</sup> while other three organizations adhering to the MB methodology were relatively weak and were competing each other because of many local and external factors. However, by 1990s, Islah emerged strongly with robust socio-political programs and has made an impact on other Islamist organizations in the socio-political sectors. Moreover, new organization under the name of *Jamā'at at-Tablīgh* (Society for spreading faith) have been taking strong roots in Somalia since 1991 targeting grass roots level and reaching out across social and economic spectra.<sup>52</sup>

## **Conclusion**

Historical evolution of the Islamic movements went through four major stages: the Islamic revival, the Islamic consciousness, the Islamic awakening and the Islamic movements. In all these stages, the role of Islam in the state and society was growing and both moderation and militancy were evident in every historical juncture. Militancy was always related to the Salafia influence while moderation was linked to Muslim brotherhood persuasion. This paper had demonstrated that Islamic movements share common historical background and advocate for the application of Islamic principles and values in the state and society. Nonetheless, they are not monolithic in their approaches and could be classified generally into Muslim Brotherhood and Salafia persuasions. Besides these two major persuasions, traditional Sufi brotherhoods remain functional even though some of them have been politicized under the name of “*Ahl-al-Sunna wal-Jama'a*”.<sup>53</sup>

In the final remarks, Islamic movements in Somalia were not immune from the social culture of fragmentation, internal competition, low organizational capacity and leadership crisis. Nevertheless, they are vital socio-political reality and their contribution in the provision of social services in the absence of the functioning state institutions is matchless. Moreover, the role of Islamist entrepreneurs in reviving economic sectors is incomparable. Furthermore, since 2000, Islamists became prominent in politics and Islamic compliant constitution was adopted. Since 2008, both national leaders and armed oppositions were belonging to the Islamic persuasions.<sup>54</sup> Finally, even though, Somalia lacks competing ideology with Islamic trends, it is also undeniable that Islamists lack necessary experience and expertise in the political sphere. Thus, current trend indicates growing role of inclusive policy based on equal rights of all citizens without discrimination and narrowing gap between Islamists and non-Islamists and their mutual cooperation in recovering Somali state.



## **Notes and References**

- <sup>1</sup> Abdullahi, Abdurahman, “The Islamic Movement in Somalia: A Historical Evolution with the Case Study of Islah Movement (1950-2000)” (PhD thesis, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 2011). This thesis was published in 2015 by Adonis & Abby Publisher under the title “*The Islamic Movement in Somalia: A Study of Islah Movement, 1950-2000*”.
- <sup>2</sup> See Karim-Aly Kassam, “The clash of Civilization: The selling of Fear”, available from <https://dspace.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/1880/44170/1/Islam.pdf> (accessed on February 14, 2011).
- <sup>3</sup> These two works are: Douglass Jardine, *The Mad Mullah of Somaliland* (London: Herbert Jinkines, 1923) and Francesco Carrosseli, *Ferro e Fuoco in Somalia: Venti Anni di Lotte Contro Mullah e Dervisc* (Roma: Sindicato Italiano Arti Grafiche, 1931).
- <sup>4</sup> See Abdi Sheik Abdi, *Divine Madness: Mohammed Abdulle Hassan (1856-1920)* (Zed Books Ltd., London, 1993). Also, Said Samatar, *Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism: The Case of Sayyid Mahammad Abdille Hasan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
- <sup>5</sup> I. M. Lewis, *Saints and Somalis: Popular Islam in a Clan-based Society* (Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 1998).
- <sup>6</sup> Bradford G. Martin, “Shaykh Uways bin Muhammad al-Barawi, a Traditional Somali Sufi,” in *Manifestations of Sainthood in Islam*, ed. G. M. Smith and Carl Ernst (Istanbul: ISIS, 1993), 225-37. Reese, Scott S., *Urban Woes and Pious Remedies: Sufism in Nineteenth-Century Banaadir (Somalia)* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999). Said Samatar, “Sheikh Uways Muhammad of Baraawe, 1847-1909: Mystic and Reformer in East Africa,” in *the Shadows of Conquest: Islam in Colonial Northeast Africa*, ed. Said S. Samatar (Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1992), 48-74.
- <sup>7</sup> Mohamed Ahmed Jumale “Castro”, “Dawr Ulama Junub al-Somal fi al-Da‘wa al-Islamiyah (1889-1941)” (PhD diss., University of Omdurman, Khartoum, 2007).

- <sup>8</sup> Medhane Tadesse, *Al-Ittihad: Political Islam and Black economy in Somalia: Religion, Clan, Money, Clan and the Struggle for Supremacy over Somalia* (Addis Ababa: Meag Printing Enterprise, 2002).
- <sup>9</sup> Shaul Shay, *Somalia between Jihad and Restoration* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2008).
- <sup>10</sup> Andre Le Sage, "Somalia and War on Terrorism: Political Islamic Movements & US counter Terrorism Efforts" (PhD thesis, the Jesus College, Cambridge University, 2004).
- <sup>11</sup> Stig Hansen, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012* (London: Hurst and Co., 2013).
- <sup>12</sup> Roland Marchal, "Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War," in *Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa*, ed. Alex De Waal (Indiana University Press, 2006), 114-146.
- <sup>13</sup> Hussein M. Adam, "Political Islam in Somali History," in *Milk and Peace, Drought and War: Somali Culture, Society and Politics*, ed. Markus Hoehne and Virginia Luling (London: Hurst & Company, 2010), 119-135.
- <sup>14</sup> International Crisis Group, "Somalia's Islamist" (African Report No. 100, December 12, 2005), available from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/100-somalias-islamists.aspx> (accessed on 22 June, 2010).
- <sup>15</sup> Stig Jarle Hansen and Atle Mesoy, "The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa" (Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR) Report 2009), 33.
- <sup>16</sup> Afyare Abdi Elmi, *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam and Peace building* (London: Pluto Press, 2010), 72.
- <sup>17</sup> Said Samatar, *Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism: The Case of Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 97.
- <sup>18</sup> Scott Steven Rees, *Patricians of the Banadir: Islamic Learning, Commerce and Somali Urban Identity in the Nineteenth Century* (PhD thesis submitted to the University of Pennsylvania, 1996), 306.

- <sup>19</sup> The nature of peacefulness of Sufi Orders may be interrupted because of external provocations, such as colonialism in the case of many scholars, exemplified by Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, and internal doctrinal conflicts, such as the conflict between Bardheere Jama'a and Geledi Sultanates and current fighting between Shabab and Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama'a.
- <sup>20</sup> David Laitin, and Said Samatar, *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987) 45.
- <sup>21</sup> Most scholars fail to distinguish between the original Sufi order and their later derivatives. Sometimes these Sufi orders are said to be three, making Salihyah a separate order from Ahmadiyah and also neglecting the existence of the Rufaiyah Order. See Laitin and Samatar, *Somalia: Nation*, 45.
- <sup>22</sup> See Mohamed Abdallah Al-Naqira, *Intishar al-Islam fi Sharq Ifriqiyah wa Munahadat al-Garbi Lahu* (Riyadh: Dar al-Marikh, 1982), 160.
- <sup>23</sup> Abdirisq Aqli, *Sheikh Madar: Asaasaha Hargeysa* (biographical work on Sheikh Madar written in Somali Language, no date or publishing house).
- <sup>24</sup> Lewis, *Saints*, 36.
- <sup>25</sup> See Saadia Touval, *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 65.
- <sup>26</sup> Mohamed Mukhtar, *Historical dictionary of Somalia* (African Historical Dictionary Series, Lanham: MD: Scarecrow Press, 2003), 106. Also, Salah Mohamed Ali, *Hudur and the History of Southern Somalia* (Cairo: Mahda Bookshop Publisher, 2005), 340.
- <sup>27</sup> Abdurahman Abdullahi, "Non-state Actors in the Failed State of Somalia: Survey of the Civil Society Organizations during the Civil War (1990-2002)." *Darasat Ifriqiyah*, 31 (2004): 57-87. See also Salah Mohamed Ali, *Hudur*, 361.
- <sup>28</sup> I. M. Lewis, *A Modern History*, 121. The destroyed or removed projects include the railway line connecting Mogadishu, Afgoye, and Villagio Della Abuzzi; Afgoye Bridge; salt production machinery in Hafun; and Maggiajan and Kandala mines. See Paolo Tripodi, *The Colonial Legacy in Somalia*:

*Rome and Mogadishu: from Colonial Administration to Operation Restore Hope* (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), 45.

<sup>29</sup> Two national heroes that were given special position in the Somali History were Imam Ahmed Gurey (Garan) and Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan. Imam Ahmed fought against Ethiopian and Portuguese intervention forces, representing Christian superpowers of that time, from 1531 until he was killed in 1543. Ahmad's war with Ethiopia is described in detail in the *Futuh al-habaša* ("The Conquest of Ethiopia"), written in Arabic by Ahmad's follower *Shihab al-Addin Ahmad ibn Abdulqadir*. Sayid Mohamed fought against Ethiopia and Britain in 1900-1921. References on Sayid Mohamed are many; however, two academic works stand out: Abdi Sheik Abdi, *Divine Madness: Mohammed Abdulle Hassan (1856-1920)* (Zed Books Ltd., London, 1993), and Said S. Samatar, *Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism: The Case of Sayyid Mahammad Abdille Hasan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

<sup>30</sup> Islamist is an activist in realizing objectives of the Islamic movements which includes wide range of activities such as promoting Islamic beliefs, prescriptions, laws, or policies that are held to be Islamic in character. On the other hand, non-Islamists signify majority of the Muslims who are neither secular nor Islamic activists, some of whom are not even practicing Islam or even pretending to be secular nominally.

<sup>31</sup> For detailed description of the elite development and their relations refer to Abdurahman Abdullahi, "Tribalism, Nationalism and Islam: The crisis of the political Loyalties in Somalia (MA thesis, Islamic Institute, McGill University, 1992), 92-101.

<sup>32</sup> Saudi Arabia offered a loan of \$50 million to Somalia designated to cover the election expenses in support of the SYL regime. See Mohamed Sharif Mohamud, "*Faslun fi al-Alaqat al-Somaliyah al-Saudiyah*", 2010 (Somali-Saudi relations), available from <http://arabic.alshahid.net/columnists/8598> (accessed on February 6, 2010). This number seems exaggerated even though Mohamed Sharif insists that \$50 million loan is true in my interview with him in Mogadishu on June 27, 2015.

- <sup>33</sup> In 1969, all MPs joined the SYL except one person, the former Prime Minister Abdirisac Haji Hussein.
- <sup>34</sup> Abdalla Mansur, "Contrary to a Nation: The Cancer of Somali State" in Ahmed, Ali Jimale (ed), *The Invention of Somalia* (Lawrenceville, NJ, Red Sea Press, 1995), 114
- <sup>35</sup> NFD is the region in Kenya populated by the Somali people, while Western Somalia or Ogaden is a Somali territory annexed by Ethiopia. Both parts have Somali populations and are in the Horn of Africa. They had been divided by the colonial powers and then reclaimed by the Somali state as part of the "Greater Somalia."
- <sup>36</sup> See Ibrahim Farah, "Foreign Policy and Conflict in Somalia, 1960-1990" (PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2009), 107.
- <sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 117.
- <sup>38</sup> *Nahdah* was established in 1967 in Mogadishu, and had engaged in various Islamic activities, such as the establishment of libraries with contains MB literature and the *Da'wa* programs. The most popular program was the Qur'anic commentary of Sheikh Mohamed Moalim Hassan (1934-2000), which started in 1968 and continued until 1976.
- <sup>39</sup> Sayid Qutub (1906-1966) was an Islamist scholar and the leading intellectual of the MB in the 1950s and 1960s. He was imprisoned (1954-64) and then hanged in 1966 by Jamal Abdi-Nasser. The other two members were Muhammad Yusuf Awash and Abd al-Fattah Ismail. See Zafar Bangash, "Remembering Sayyid Qutb, an Islamic intellectual and leader of rare insight and integrity", available from [http://web.youngmuslims.ca/online\\_library/books/milestones/remember.htm](http://web.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/milestones/remember.htm) (accessed on January 28, 2010).
- <sup>40</sup> The influence of the MB was clear in the bye-laws of Nahdah and its top leaders, the president, the vice president, and the secretary general were members of the MB. For more details refer to AbdurahmanAbdullahi, "The Islamic Movement in Somalia", 172- 176

- <sup>41</sup> Ahal was established in 1969 and was transformed from Sufism to proto-MB in late 1960s as they are affected by the Qur'an commentary of Sheikh Mohamed Moalim Hassan and the Islamic library of Nahdah. For more details of Ahal, refer to AbdurahmanAbdullahi, "The Islamic Movement in Somalia", 182-190.
- <sup>42</sup> Wahdah was formed in Hargeysa in 1969 and transformed from Sufism to proto-MB transpired in 1974. For more details of Wahdah refer to AbdurahmanAbdullahi, "The Islamic Movement in Somalia", 191-203.
- <sup>43</sup> *Jamiyat Ihya al-Sunna* was founded in 1967 by Sheikh Nur Ali Olow (1918-1995) and its role was insignificant even though influenced some prominent personalities like General Mohamed Abshir and Yassin Nur Hassan, former Interior Minister.
- <sup>44</sup> Abdurahman Abdullahi, "Women, Islamists and the Military Regime in Somalia: The New Family Law and its Implications". In *Milk and Peace, Drought and War: Somali Culture, Society and Politics. (Essays in Honour of I. M. Lewis)*, edited by M. V. Hoehne and V. Luling, 137 Á 160. London: Hurst, 2010.
- <sup>45</sup> Wahdah and Jama'a Islamiyah formed Itihad al-Islami in 1983 in a precipitate merging that did not last long. At the end, most of the Wahdah members joined Itihad or Islah in 1990s. For more details refer to Abdurahman Abdullahi, "The Islamic Movement in Somalia", 202-203.
- <sup>46</sup> The Somali government ordered its forces to retreat from Ethiopia on March 9, 1978, and the last significant Somali unit left Ethiopia on March 15, 1978, marking a disastrous end of the war.
- <sup>47</sup> Many of the former members of Nahdah were in prison and others were made aware of the reorganizing of the organization under a new name.
- <sup>48</sup> Hassan Haji Mohamud interviewed by the author, April 10, 2010, Nairobi, Kenya.
- <sup>49</sup> Itihad is the mother organization of Salafia in Somalia; it was renamed as *Al-Ictisam bil-Kitabi wa Sunnah* or Itisam in mid 1990s. Hence, Itihad and

Itisam became synonym. In the beginning of 1990s Itihad was drifting toward militancy and was entangled in armed conflicts from 1991 to 1997, after that it became fragmented and its activities were downgraded.

- <sup>50</sup> Ikhwan, also known as *Aala-Sheikh*, was established after the release of Sheikh Mohamed Moalim from the prison in 1982. Sheikh Mohamed was designated to be their guide and mentor.
- <sup>51</sup> Salafism had spread globally in as part of the rising influence of Saudi Arabia in global politics in 1960s. In Somalia, due to its being part of the Saudi geopolitical sphere, the influence of Salafism was noticeably augmented through students educated in the Saudi Islamic universities and through Somali migrant labour during the economic boom of the 1970s. For more details refer to AbdurahmanAbdullahi, “*The Islamic Movement in Somalia*, 276-277.
- <sup>52</sup> *Jamā‘at at-Tablīgh* or Tablighi Jama'a This movement was started in 1927 by Muhammad al-Kandhlawi in India to spread faith and spiritual reformation by working at the grass roots level. It became very active in Somalia after the civil war in 1991.
- <sup>53</sup> Ahlu Sunna Wa al-Jama'a is a paramilitary Sufi group who became prominent in 2008, when it took up arms against al-Shabaab, the extremist group who began to destroy the tombs of the country's Sufi scholars.
- <sup>54</sup> After the election of Sheikh Sharif (2008-2012) and Hassan Sheikh (2012-2016) as the Presidents of Somalia and the emergence of Al-Shabab as the armed opposition to the state, Islamists took unchallenged prominent political role in Somalia.